A metering scheme allows a correct counting on the number of hits that a Web site received during a certain period. In this paper, we first derive tight lower bounds on the communication complexity |Vi| (i = 1, . . . , n) and the size of server's secrets |Es| for robust and perfect (k, n)-metering schemes. We next show an almost equivalence between (k, n)-metering schemes and k-multiple-use A 2 -codes. Finally, by using this equivalence, we derive lower bounds on |Vi| and |Es| for robust (but not necessarily perfect) (k, n)-metering schemes.
We say that a (k, n)-metering scheme is -robust if it satisfies all the three security requirements.
-non-robust if it satisfies only the security against servers.
We further say that a (k, n)-metering scheme is perfect if S gains no information on proof from any k−1 or less shares. (It is interesting that the metering schemes proposed so far are all perfect.)
For non-robust and perfect metering schemes, a lower bound on the communication complexity |V i | (i = 1, . . . , n) was shown by De Bonis, B. Masucci [4] and by Masucci and Stinson [3] , where V i is a set of possible values v i which is sent by client C i to S when C i has access to S. (They considered a more general model than ours such that there are multiple Web servers and there exists a ramp structure among clients.)
However, non-robust metering schemes are not practical. We cannot assume that clients are all honest. We cannot assume that there is no outside enemy, either.
In this paper, we derive lower bounds on the communication complexity |V i | (i = 1, . . . , n) and the size of server's secrets |E s | for robust (k, n)-metering schemes.
We first derive lower bounds on |V i | and |E s | for "perfect and robust" (k, n)-metering schemes by using counting arguments. We also present a slightly modified version of the Ogata-Kurosawa scheme [2] and prove that it satisfies all the equalities of our bounds. This means that our bounds are all tight.
We next show an almost equivalence between robust (k, n)-metering schemes and k-multiple-use A 2 -codes such that we can always construct a k-multipleuse A 2 -code from a (k, n)-metering scheme, and in some cases, we can do the reverse. By using this equivalence, we derive lower bounds on |V i | and |E s | for robust (but not necessarily perfect) (k, n)-metering schemes. This equivalence is of independent interest because no relationship has been known between them so far.
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Preliminaries

Model of Metering Schemes
A (k, n)-metering scheme consists of three phases.
Initialization Phase: An audit agency A first generates a proof , a secret key e s of the Web server S and a share v i of client C i for i = 1, . . . , n. A then gives e s to S and v i to C i for i = 1, . . . , n secretly. (k, n)-metering schemes must satisfy the security against malicious servers, the security against malicious clients and the security against outside enemies. These security are defined in the following subsections.
Security against Malicious Servers
A (k, n)-metering scheme must be secure at least against malicious servers. A malicious server tries to forge a proof from only k − 1 shares of clients. Hence S should not be able to inflate her hit counts. (There appears to be no way to detect whether S is deflating her hit counts.)
Formally, a malicious S corrupts some k − 1 clients C i1 , . . . , C i k−1 adaptively and then obtains their k − 1 shares. S next forges a proof , hoping that proof = proof . The cheating probability of this attack is defined by
It is required that P S is negligible in any metering scheme.
Perfect Metering Scheme
We say that a metering scheme is perfect if S gains no information on proof from any k − 1 shares. Note that this is a stronger notion of security against server's attack than saying only that P S is negligible.
Definition 1. We say that a (k, n)-metering scheme is perfect if
It is interesting that the metering schemes proposed so far are all perfect.
Robust Metering Scheme
We say that a metering scheme is robust if it is secure against malicious clients and outside enemies as well as malicious servers.
Malicious clients try to forge an illegal share which would be accepted by S, but would not allow S to compute the correct proof . An outside enemy tries to forge a (legal or illegal) share which would be accepted by S. If it is legal, it causes a counting error because he is not a monitor. If it is illegal, it does not allow S to compute the correct proof .
Clients' Attack: Some (even all) clients collude and make a forged share v i = v i for some client C i . This attack will prevent S from computing the proof even if k or more clients visited S. (For example, one illegal share and k − 1 honest shares yield an illegal proof that is rejected by A.) The cheating probability is defined by
Outside Enemy's Attack: An outside enemy is interested in his attack before S computes a proof. Therefore, it must send the forged share to S before S receives k shares. In other words, the outside enemy can observe at most k − 1 shares sent by clients before computing a forged share. To summarize, the outside enemy makes a forged share v i for some client C i by observing l < k shares of the other clients. The cheating probability of this attack is defined by
A metering scheme is called robust if P C and P E are negligible.
Bounds for Non-robust Metering Scheme
A lower bound on the size of |V i | for non-robust and perfect metering schemes was shown by De Bonis, B. Masucci [4] and by Masucci and Stinson [3] . They considered a more general model than ours such that there are multiple servers.
Proposition 1. [3, Corollary 3.9]
In a non-robust and perfect (k, n)-metering scheme for multi servers,
where s is the number of corrupted servers.
They also generalized their bound to ramp structures among clients. In non-robust metering schemes, S does not need to have any e s ∈ E s to check the shares of clients because there exist no malicious clients and outside enemies. Therefore, a lower bound on |E s | is meaningless in this case.
Bounds for "Perfect and Robust" Metering Scheme
Non-robust metering schemes are not practical. We cannot assume that clients are all honest. We cannot assume that there is no outside enemy, either.
In this section, we derive a lower bound on |V i | and a lower bound on |E s | for perfect and robust (k, n)-metering schemes. We also present a slightly modified version of the Ogata-Kurosawa scheme [2] and prove that it satisfies all the equalities of our bounds. This means that our bounds are all tight.
Lower Bound on
Proof. Fix any possible e s , v i1 , . . . , v i k−1 arbitrarily. Then any proof ∈ Proof can happen with positive probability in a perfect (k, n)-metering scheme. On the other hand, each
uniquely. This means that there exists an onto mapping from
Theorem 1. In a perfect and robust (k, n)-metering scheme,
Proof. We will derive a lower bound on P E . Define
Pr(e s ) (from Corollary 1)
= |Proof |.
Lower Bound on |E
s | Define ALL = {(v 1 , . . . , v k ) | Pr(V 1 = v 1 , . . . ,V k = v k ) > 0}, ALL(e s ) = {(v 1 , . . . , v k ) | Pr(Ê s = e s ,V 1 = v 1 , . . . ,V k = v k ) > 0}.
Lemma 2. If the equality of corollary 1 holds for all i, then
Proof. From the equality of Corollary 1 and Lemma 1,
Hence,
By repeating this process, we have |ALL(e s )| = |Proof | k .
Lemma 3. |V
Proof. Similar to the proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that an outside enemy E observes l shares sent by clients, say
Therefore,
Pr(e s | v).
Next they choose v
Clearly, this attack succeeds if S has e s . Therefore,
Proof. First from Theorem 1,
Next from Lemma 3,
By repeating this process, we obtain that |ALL| ≥ |Proof | 
Proof. First from Lemma 2,
On the other hand, it is easy to see that
Modified Ogata-Kurosawa Scheme
We next present a slightly modified version of the Ogata-Kurosawa scheme [2] and prove that it satisfies all the equalities of our bounds. This means that our bounds are all tight. The modified Ogata-Kurosawa scheme is described as follows. Let p > n be a large prime number.
Initialization Phase: 1. An audit agency A chooses a random number r ∈ Z p and two random polynomials f 0 (y) and f 1 (y) with degree at most k − 1 over GF (p). 2. Let proof = f 1 (0). 3. A gives e s = (r, g(y)) to the Web server S, where
Proof Computing Phase: If k or more clients visited S, then S can compute proof = f 1 (0) by using Lagrange formula.
In the above scheme, it is clear that
We then prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.
The modified Ogata-Kurosawa scheme is perfect and
Proof. Note that the secret key of A is K = (r, f 0 (y), f 1 (y)).
For simplicity, let
arbitrarily. We will show that there exists a unique (f 0 (y), f 1 (y)) for each value of proof . Fix proof arbitrarily. First there exists a unique f 1 (y) such that
because e s = (r, g(y)) is fixed. Therefore, each value of proof is equally likely to happen for any fixed e s , v 1 , . . . , v k−1 . This means that
Hence the scheme is perfect.
Fix
and i ∈ {1, . . . , n} arbitrarily. Let B 0 be the set of K = (r, f 0 (y), f 1 (y)) such that eq.(4) holds.
We will compute |B 0 | and |B 1 |. First since f 0 (y) and f 1 (y) are uniquely determined from eq.(4), we have
On the other hand, from eq. (2),
The above equation has at most one solution on r because (a , b ) = (a i , b i ). Therefore, max |B 1 | = 1. Hence
3. For simplicity, let l = k − 1 and
and i(≥ k) arbitrarily. Let B 0 be the set of K = (r, f 0 (y), f 1 (y)) such that eq.(5) holds. For v = (a , b ) let B 1 be a subset of B 0 such that S accepts (i, v ). Then
We will compute |B 0 | and |B 1 |. First since f 0 (y) and f 1 (y) are uniquely determined from the values of f 0 (0) and f 1 (0), we have
In the above equation, f 0 (i) is uniquely determined from each values of (r, f 1 (i)). (Note that f 0 (y) and f 1 (y) are uniquely determined from each values of f 0 (i) and f 1 (i).) Therefore,
Hence
It is now easy to see that all the equalities of our bounds are satisfied by the above scheme.
(Remark) In the original Ogata-Kurosawa scheme, proof = f 0 (0) and r is randomly chosen from Z p \ {0}. Therefore, P C = 1/(p − 1) and |E s | = (p − 1)p k .
Lower Bounds for Multiple-Use A 2 -code
For multiple-use A 2 -codes, Wang. et.al. derived a lower bound on the cheating probabilities and a lower bound on the size of keys [8] . (See Appendix A.) However, their bound on the size of keys holds under the condition that the cheating probabilities satisfy their lower bound (see Proposition 3). We can not derive a lower bound on the size of authenticators from their result, either.
In this section, we first define the cheating probabilities in a different way from [8] . We then derive a lower bound on the size of keys which holds for any values of the cheating probabilities. We derive a lower bound on the size of authenticators, also.
The result of this section will be used in the following sections.
Multiple-Use A 2 -code
In the model for unconditionally secure authentication codes (A-codes), the transmitter T and the receiver R use the same encoding rule to protect their communication from deception of an outside enemy O. An authentication code with arbitration (A 2 -code) enables to authenticate a message sent by T to R even if T and R do not trust each other [6, 7] . A 2 -code includes the fourth person called an arbiter A , who solves disputes between T and R.
In this paper, we consider A 2 -codes which are used to send multiple messages. If T can use an A 2 -code to send k − 1 messages to R which are authenticated, then we call the code a k-multiple-use A 2 We define the cheating probabilities of k-multiple-use A 2 -code as follows, where P T , P Ri and P Oi denote the cheating probabilities by T , R and O, respectively.
Pr(e r (s, a) = 1)
Lower Bounds
In this subsection, we present a lower bound on the cheating probabilities defined as above. It is a generalization of a lower bound for usual A 2 -codes given by Johansson [10] .
Theorem 4.
The proof will be given in the final paper. We then obtain a lower bound on the size of keys as follows.
Theorem 5. IfŜ is uniformly distributed, then
Proof. From Theorem 4,
The second bound can be derived similarly. The bound on |A| is derived as follows.
From Theorem 4, it holds that
We can see that the above bounds are tight because there exists an A 2 -code which satisfies all the equalities of them (see appendix B).
Almost Equivalence
In this section, we show an almost equivalence between robust (k, n)-metering schemes and k-multiple-use A 2 -codes such that we can always construct a kmultiple-use A 2 -code from a (k, n)-metering scheme, and in some cases, we can do the reverse.
In what follows, we define the cheating probability of clients and the cheating probability of outside enemies as follows.
where E is taken over v 1 , . . . , v n .
where E is taken over i 1 , . . . , i l and v i1 , . . . , v i l . The cheating probabilities of k-multiple-use A 2 -codes are defined in the previous section.
Metering Scheme Implies a Multiple-Use A 2 -code
First, we show that a (k, n)-metering scheme implies a k-multiple-use A 2 -code. Wlog, suppose that V i ⊆ V , where |V | = max i |V i |.
Theorem 6.
If there exists a (k, n)-metering scheme with (Proof , E s , {V i }) and (P C , P S ,P E ), then there exists a k-multiple-use A 2 -code with (E t , E r , S, A) and
Proof. Suppose that there exists a (k, n)-metering scheme with (Proof , E s , {V i }) and (P C , P S ,P E ). We then construct a k-multiple-use A 2 -code as follows. 
It is clear that
Next it is easy to see that an outside enemy's attack on the (k, n)-metering scheme can be directly used as an outside enemy's attack on the k-multiple-use A 2 -code and vice versa. Therefore, P O =P E . A clients' attack on the (k, n)-metering scheme is that all clients collude and make a forged share v s = v s . In other words, from given (1, v 1 ) , . . . , (n, v n ), they make v s = v s for some s, hoping that it is accepted by S with her secret key e s . Then it is easy to see that this attack can be directly used as a transmitter's attack on the k-multiple-use A 2 -code. Therefore, P T ≥P C . It is easy to see that the converse part is also true. HenceP C ≥ P T . Therefore, P T =P C .
Suppose that there exists a receiver's attack R attack on the k-multiple-use A 2 -code with success probability P R . Then we consider a server's attack on the (k, n)-metering scheme as follows. Suppose that l < k clients C i1 , . . . , C i l visited S. S runs R attack on input e r and l messages ( than {i 1 , . . . , i l , s} and obtains their shares. Then S obtains k shares v i1 , . . . , v i k−1 and v s in total. Therefore, S can compute the proof from the k shares. This attack succeeds with probability P R . Hence, P S ≥ P R .
Weak Converse
Next, we show a weak converse of Theorem 6. 
Lemma 6. In a k-multiple-use
Proof. (Sketch) Using a k-multiple-use A 2 -code, construct a metering scheme described as follows. A chooses s 0 ∈ S and sets proof = e t (s 0 ). Each client C i receives v i = e t (s i ) where S = {s 0 , . . . , s n }.
If |E t | satisfies the equality of the bound, e t is determined uniquely from k or more valid messages (from Lemma 6). Then the server can obtain proof = e t (s 0 ) if he has been visited by k or more clients. The rest of the proof is similar to Theorem 6.
Lower Bounds for Robust Metering Scheme
In this section, we derive a lower bound on |V i | and a lower bound on |E s | for robust (but not necessarily perfect) (k, n)-metering schemes by using our relationship between metering schemes and multiple A 2 -codes (and our lower bounds for k-multiple-use A 2 -codes of Sec.4).
Bounds for Robust Metering Schemes
From Theorem 5 and Theorem 6, we immediately obtain a lower bound on the size of keys for (k, n)-metering schemes as follows.
Corollary 2.
In a (k, n)-metering scheme, if each client visits the Web sever S with equal probability, then
Corollary 2 is tight because the Ogata-Kurosawa metering scheme satisfies all the equalities of the bound (see Sec.3.3).
Bound onP E
We can removeP E from the above bound by using Theorem 8.
Theorem 8.
In a (k, n)-metering scheme,
The first term of the right hand is equal or less than P S , while the second term is equal or less thanP C .
Corollary 3.
Conclusion
In this paper, We first derived lower bounds on |V i | and |E s | for "perfect and robust" (k, n)-metering schemes by using counting arguments, where |V i | (i = 1, . . . , n) is the communication complexity and and |E s | is the size of server's secrets. We also presented a slightly modified version of the Ogata-Kurosawa scheme [2] and proved that it satisfies all the equalities of our bounds. This means that our bounds are all tight. We next showed an almost equivalence between robust (k, n)-metering schemes and k-multiple-use A 2 -codes such that we can always construct a kmultiple-use A 2 -code from a (k, n)-metering scheme, and in some cases, we can do the reverse. By using this equivalence, we derived lower bounds on |V i | and |E s | for robust (but not necessarily perfect) (k, n)-metering schemes. This equivalence is of independent interest because no relationship has been known between them so far. [8] . However, they did not show an explicit construction of that design. Therefore, no explicit construction of k-multiple-use A 2 -code is known. By substituting the modified Ogata-Kurosawa metering scheme into the proof of Theorem 6, we immediately obtain an explicit construction of a k-multiple-use A 2 -code as follows. Let p be a large prime number.
A Bounds for
Initialization Phase: An arbiter A chooses a random number r ∈ Z p and two random polynomials f 0 (y) and f 1 (y) with degree at most k − 1 over GF (p). Let e t = (f 0 (y), f 1 (y)) and e r = (r, g(y)), where g(y) = f 0 (y) + rf 1 (y). Then A gives e t to T and e r to R secretly as their secret keys. It is clear that |E t | = p 2k , |E r | = p k+1 , |A| = p 2 . From eq.(3) and Theorem 6, it holds that P T = 1/p, P R ≤ 1/p, P O = 1/p. More than that, we can show the following lemma.
Lemma 7. In the above k-multiple-use A
2 -code, P R = 1/p.
Proof. R has a secret key e r = (r, g(y)), where g(y) = f 0 (y) + rf 1 (y) for some f 0 (y) and f 1 (y) with degree at most k − 1. Suppose that R received m 1 = (s 1 , a 1 ) , . . . , m l = (s l , a l ). Let s 1 )) , . . . , a l = (f 0 (s l ), f 1 (s l ))}.
Then R knows that e t ∈ F 0 ∩ F 1 . Next suppose that R claims that she received (s ,a ) such that s ∈ {s 1 , . . . ,s l }. If m could be made by T , then a = (f 0 (s ), f 1 (s )). Let Then we see that our multiple-use A 2 -code is optimum and Theorem 5 is tight because our multiple-use A 2 -code satisfies all the equalities of Theorem 5.
